It was possible that a guest could overflow the `doe_cap->write_mbox` buffer by writing more then PCI_DOE_DW_SIZE_MAX dwords. `doe_cap->write_mbox_len` would continue to increment and there were no bounds checks on the length when offsetting into doe_cap->write_mbox. This patch adds a check and reports a guest error if we would overflow. On an overflow we also silenty discard the entire object as instructed to do in the PCIe spec when the length specified in the header (up to PCI_DOE_DW_SIZE_MAX dwords) doesn't match the length of the object. Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3679 Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@oss.qualcomm.com> Reviewed-by: Tao Tang <tangtao1634@phytium.com.cn> Message-ID: <20260707020750.788960-1-alistair.francis@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>