137 lines
9.4 KiB
HTML
137 lines
9.4 KiB
HTML
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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<!DOCTYPE html
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PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
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<html lang="en-us" xml:lang="en-us">
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<head>
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<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" />
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<meta name="security" content="public" />
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<meta name="Robots" content="index,follow" />
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<meta http-equiv="PICS-Label" content='(PICS-1.1 "http://www.icra.org/ratingsv02.html" l gen true r (cz 1 lz 1 nz 1 oz 1 vz 1) "http://www.rsac.org/ratingsv01.html" l gen true r (n 0 s 0 v 0 l 0) "http://www.classify.org/safesurf/" l gen true r (SS~~000 1))' />
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<meta name="DC.Type" content="concept" />
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<meta name="DC.Title" content="Authorization" />
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<meta name="abstract" content="This information explains the process of authorization, some different authorization methods, and the role it plays in a single signon solution." />
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<meta name="description" content="This information explains the process of authorization, some different authorization methods, and the role it plays in a single signon solution." />
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<meta name="DC.Relation" scheme="URI" content="rzamzconcepts.htm" />
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<meta name="copyright" content="(C) Copyright IBM Corporation 2000, 2006" />
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<meta name="DC.Rights.Owner" content="(C) Copyright IBM Corporation 2000, 2006" />
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<meta name="DC.Format" content="XHTML" />
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<meta name="DC.Identifier" content="rzamzauthorization" />
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<meta name="DC.Language" content="en-us" />
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<!-- All rights reserved. Licensed Materials Property of IBM -->
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<!-- US Government Users Restricted Rights -->
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<!-- Use, duplication or disclosure restricted by -->
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<!-- GSA ADP Schedule Contract with IBM Corp. -->
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<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="./ibmdita.css" />
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<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="./ic.css" />
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<title>Authorization</title>
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</head>
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<body id="rzamzauthorization"><a name="rzamzauthorization"><!-- --></a>
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<!-- Java sync-link --><script language="Javascript" src="../rzahg/synch.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
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<h1 class="topictitle1">Authorization</h1>
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<div><p>This information explains the process of authorization, some different
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authorization methods, and the role it plays in a single signon solution.</p>
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<p>Authorization is a process in which a user is granted access to a network
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or system resource. Most enterprises use a two-stage process to allow users
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to access network assets. The first stage of this process is <a href="rzamzauthentication.htm#rzamzauthentication">authentication</a>. Authentication is a process in which
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a user identifies themselves to the enterprise. Typically this requires the
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user to provide an identifier and a password to the security component of
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the enterprise. The security component verifies the information that it receives.
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After a successful authentication, the user is issued a process they can
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use, a credential, or a ticket to use to demonstrate that they have already
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authenticated to the enterprise. An example of a user authentication is the
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ID and password challenge on an <span class="keyword">iSeries™ Navigator</span> connection.
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After successful authentication, the user is assigned a job that runs under
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their user ID. The second stage is authorization. It is important to know
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the distinction between authentication and authorization.</p>
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<p>Authorization is the process of determining if an entity or person has
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the authority to access an asset within an enterprise. Authorization checks
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are done after a user has authenticated to the enterprise, because authorization
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requires that the enterprise knows who is trying to gain access. Authorization
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checking is mandatory and occurs as part of the system. Users are typically
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unaware that authorization checks occur unless their access is denied. An
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example of authorization occurs when a user uses the command <samp class="codeph">CRTSRCPF
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QGPL/MYFILE</samp>. The system performs authorization checks on the command <samp class="codeph">CRTSRCPF</samp> and
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the library <samp class="codeph">QGPL</samp>. If the user does not have the authority
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to access the command and the library, the user's request fails.</p>
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<div class="p">An enterprise that has implemented the <span class="keyword">i5/OS™</span> single
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signon solution uses <a href="../rzalv/rzalvmst.htm">Enterprise
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Identity Mapping (EIM)</a> to manage user access to enterprise assets.
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While EIM does not perform authorization checks, the identity mapping establishes
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the local identities for users that have successfully authenticated into the
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enterprise. The source (or user) receives access and privileges on the target
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system through the local ID. For example, assume you have the following simple
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enterprise environment:
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<div class="tablenoborder"><table cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="" frame="border" border="1" rules="all"><thead align="left"><tr><th align="center" valign="top" width="17.31958762886598%" id="d0e51">Employee Name (EIM Identity)</th>
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<th align="center" valign="top" width="17.31958762886598%" id="d0e53">Source Users (EIM Source)</th>
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<th align="center" valign="top" width="15.670103092783505%" id="d0e55">Target users for System
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A (EIM Target) </th>
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<th align="center" valign="top" width="17.11340206185567%" id="d0e57">Employee Responsibility</th>
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<th align="center" valign="top" width="32.577319587628864%" id="d0e59">System A User Comments</th>
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</tr>
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</thead>
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<tbody><tr><td valign="top" width="17.31958762886598%" headers="d0e51 ">Susan Doe</td>
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<td valign="top" width="17.31958762886598%" headers="d0e53 ">SusanD</td>
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<td valign="top" width="15.670103092783505%" headers="d0e55 ">SecOfficer</td>
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<td valign="top" width="17.11340206185567%" headers="d0e57 ">IT Security Officer</td>
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<td valign="top" width="32.577319587628864%" headers="d0e59 ">All special authority. Has access to all files and information.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr><td valign="top" width="17.31958762886598%" headers="d0e51 ">Fred Ray</td>
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<td valign="top" width="17.31958762886598%" headers="d0e53 ">FredR</td>
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<td valign="top" width="15.670103092783505%" headers="d0e55 ">PrimeAcnt</td>
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<td valign="top" width="17.11340206185567%" headers="d0e57 ">Lead Accountant</td>
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<td valign="top" width="32.577319587628864%" headers="d0e59 ">No special authority. Has access to all payroll information.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr><td valign="top" width="17.31958762886598%" headers="d0e51 ">Nancy Me</td>
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<td valign="top" width="17.31958762886598%" headers="d0e53 ">NancyM</td>
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<td valign="top" width="15.670103092783505%" headers="d0e55 ">PrimePGM</td>
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<td valign="top" width="17.11340206185567%" headers="d0e57 ">IT Application Team Leader</td>
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<td valign="top" width="32.577319587628864%" headers="d0e59 ">No special authority. Has access to all company application
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source files.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr><td valign="top" width="17.31958762886598%" headers="d0e51 ">Brian Fa</td>
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<td valign="top" width="17.31958762886598%" headers="d0e53 ">BrianF</td>
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<td valign="top" width="15.670103092783505%" headers="d0e55 ">GenAcnt1</td>
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<td valign="top" width="17.11340206185567%" headers="d0e57 ">Accountant</td>
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<td valign="top" width="32.577319587628864%" headers="d0e59 ">No special authority. Has access to some payroll information.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr><td valign="top" width="17.31958762886598%" headers="d0e51 ">Tracy So</td>
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<td valign="top" width="17.31958762886598%" headers="d0e53 ">TracyS</td>
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<td valign="top" width="15.670103092783505%" headers="d0e55 ">ITPgm2</td>
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<td valign="top" width="17.11340206185567%" headers="d0e57 ">IT Programmer</td>
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<td valign="top" width="32.577319587628864%" headers="d0e59 ">No special authority. Has access to some company application
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source files.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr><td valign="top" width="17.31958762886598%" headers="d0e51 ">Daryl La</td>
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<td valign="top" width="17.31958762886598%" headers="d0e53 ">DarylL</td>
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<td valign="top" width="15.670103092783505%" headers="d0e55 ">ITPgm3</td>
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<td valign="top" width="17.11340206185567%" headers="d0e57 ">IT Programmer</td>
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<td valign="top" width="32.577319587628864%" headers="d0e59 ">No special authority. Has access to some company application
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source files.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr><td valign="top" width="17.31958762886598%" headers="d0e51 ">Sherry Te</td>
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<td valign="top" width="17.31958762886598%" headers="d0e53 ">SherryT</td>
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<td valign="top" width="15.670103092783505%" headers="d0e55 ">PrimeMKT</td>
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<td valign="top" width="17.11340206185567%" headers="d0e57 ">Marketing Representative</td>
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<td valign="top" width="32.577319587628864%" headers="d0e59 ">No special authority. Has access to all marketing data.</td>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
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</table>
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</div>
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</div>
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<p>It is important that all of the associations between users and resources
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are set up correctly. If the associations are incorrect, users
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will have access to data outside the scope of their responsibilities, which
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is a security concern for most enterprises. System administrators need to
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be very careful when creating the EIM mappings and ensure that they map users
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to the correct local registry IDs. For example if you mapped the IT Programmer,
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Daryl La, to the SecOfficer ID instead of Susan Doe, you could compromise
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the security of the system. This reinforces the fact that security administrators
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must still take care in securing the target systems within the enterprise.</p>
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</div>
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<div>
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<div class="familylinks">
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<div class="parentlink"><strong>Parent topic:</strong> <a href="rzamzconcepts.htm" title="Use this information to learn about the underlying concepts for single signon for a better understanding of how you can plan to use single signon in your enterprise.">Concepts</a></div>
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</div>
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</div>
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</body>
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</html>
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